I am fortunate to have friends that know me well enough to know what may interest me, and thoughtful enough to bring it to my attention. In this case, a friend loaned me a copy of Enough by Bill McKibben: a treatise on the perils of nanotechnology, biotechnology and computers/robotics.
Advances in technology are going to bring us face to face with some staggering ethical questions. Is it acceptable to fix a fertilized egg if you can tell that the resulting child would have be profoundly retarded due to a genetic defect? Most of us would say that not only is that acceptable, but the right choice. Better still, in fixing genetically-transmitted diseases by rebuilding the genes in the first stages of gestatation, we remove the threat of the hereditary disease from future generations as well. Clearly, this is the right and ethical thing to do.
Let's go one step deeper: suppose you could tell the resulting child would not be profoundly retarded, but you could tell from the gene sequence that she would be a little "slow". Not an IQ of 80, but maybe 90 (10 points below average) due to a specific gene (let's call it 247-A -- that's fictitious, by the way) that will reduce the levels of neurotransmitters in her brain. Most of us (since we can spot a specific reparable problem) would also vote for the repair. However, many of us would also have a sense of unease: we're moving closer to "improving" rather then "repairing".
Beyond this point lies the area where many, many people become uneasy: genetic enhancement of "normal" embryos leading to "superhumans". However, we are already crossing that line when we start fixing gene 247-A by moving the average IQ higher (simply because 247-A won't pull people down any more). Now new genetic "defects" become apparent that keep people below the new average of, for instance, 110. Now Gene 323-C needs to be fixed... we're on the slippery slope between fixing and enhancing.
These issues are real, complex, profound, and staring us in the face. We need to start thinking about what is acceptable and what is not before it simply happens.
Beyond raising these types of interesting ethical conundrums, McKibben manages to veer off into visions of techno-dystopias where humans are nothing more than engineering feats without any remaining trace of humanity. While portions of these visions are real dangers which we must avoid, McKibben unfortunately moves on to projections that the perils are absolute and the benefits fleeting at best and illusionary at worst. Here McKibben and I part company.
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First, McKibben believes that by engineering ourselves to be stronger, faster, smarter, and even happier, that we will lose what it means to be human. He suggests that the runner that never tires will never feel the reward of running. This shows a lack of understanding of what such technology can and cannot do.
Like Mr. McKibben, I am a runner. I also enjoy the struggle of the run. If I was genetically engineered to be a much more efficient runner, I would derive little joy from running a few miles at 7 miles per hour. However, I would not lose the joy of running. Instead, I would find it by running 15 miles at 10 miles per hour. For me, the struggle would still be as real: it would just occur at a higher level of accomplishment.
Another argument McKibben makes is that the genetically enhanced person would lack free will. They would accomplish because they were programmed to do so. Runners would run because they were enhanced to be runners by their parents. Scientists would explore and study because they were likewise intelligence-enhanced.
I have two problems with this line of thought. The first is the implication that just because you enchance a person's cardiovascular fitness that they would have to become a runner rather than an unusually fit couch potato. The second is the implied statement that free will is dependent upon the random combination of our genes. If our genes truely determine who we are, we are no more free by having random genes that manipulated ones. You can't have it both ways and end up declaring that inherited genes lead to free will while tweaked chromosomes lead to human automatons.
Finally, Mr. McKibben seems to believe that our limits are what make us human. First and foremost among these limits is our mortality. McKibben believes that if we "lose" our mortality, we lose our humanity. He makes similar statements throughout his book regarding other limits such as fitness and intelligence.
Here is where we part ways on the most philosophical level. McKibben believes that meaning is derived from our limits. I would prefer to believe that we struggle to create meaning in spite of our limits. I don't believe that choosing to enhance who we are will reduce our ability to find meaning, but instead will give us new means for self-discovery and self-exploration.
To say that changing the shell in which we reside will destroy what we are implies that we are no more than the shell in which we reside. If that is actually the case, is there anything to destroy anyway?
